





Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zak Koninkrijksrelaties	brightsi the num security in the we	ght® ber one lab orld	TÜV Rheinland®
NLNCSA	Brightsight		Commercial certifier
Your Creative	e Solutions		
1997	2002	2009	
Accreditation	Common Criteria		Common Criteria
National	E	MVco	Consultancy
Evaluation	Evaluation	Courses	Tools
NATO	Consultancy		Training
Policy		F	Smartcards Certification lelp

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	Smartcard* (1999-now)	last 5 years	last 1.5 years
All	52%	46%	41%
≧EAL4+**	79%	89%	86%
VAN.5***	98%	92%	92%

* excludes smartcards in the "Other devices" (i.e. EU Tachograph), "Products for Digital Signatures" (i.e. EU digital signature cards), "Trusted Computing" (i.e. TPMs format smartcards) etc

** Only impactful augmentations: ALC_FLR.x excluded

*** not all entries specify AVA_VAN levels





















Security requirements for post-delivery code loading









Attacks and ratings





Separating weak from strong



Separating weak from strong



Separating weak from strong



JHAS: Attack methods and **Attack Potential**





Deconstructing a 'Secure' Processor

Black Hat - Washington D.C.

Christopher Tarnovsky Flylogic, Inc. <u>chris@flylogic.net</u> – <u>http://www.flylogic.net</u>

Black Hat Briefings



Beyond limit of the attacker (31 points)?

Identification		Exploitation	
Name	Points	Name	Points
6+ months	5 – ∞	<1 day - <1 week	3 – 6
Expert	5	Expert	4
Public - Sensitive	0 - 7	Public	0
< 1000	0 – 3	<10 - <100	0 – 4
Specialized- bespoke	3 – 5	Specialized - bespoke	4 – 6
None	0	-	-
	13 – ∞		11 – 20
		Total	24 – ∞
	Identification Name 6+ months Expert Public - Sensitive < 1000 Specialized- bespoke None	IdentificationNamePoints $6+$ months $5-\infty$ Expert 5 Public - Sensitive $0-7$ < 1000	IdentificationExploitationNamePointsName $6+$ months $5 - \infty$ <1 day - <1 week $Expert$ $5 - \infty$ <1 day - <1 week $Fublic - Sensitive0 - 7Public< 10000 - 3<10 - <100Specialized-bespoke3 - 5Specialized -bespokeNone0 13 - \inftyTotal$









Joint Interpretation Library

Minimum Site Security Requirements





SOG-IS Crypto Working Group

SOG-IS Crypto Evaluation Scheme Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms







Hardware:

- PP-0035/0084
- Promises:
 - Protection from outside*
 - Crypto does not leak*
 - Possibility to make secure software*



IC+Crypto lib:

- PP-0035/0084
 - + Packages
- Promises:
 - Protection from outside*
 - Crypto does not leak*
 - Possibility to make secure software*



JavaCard:

- HW+Crypto Library+JavaCard
- Java Card PP (Open/Closed configuration)
- Promises:
 - Applets are protected from each other*
 - Applets are protected from outside*
 - Standard crypto is available



Full smart card:

- ePassport ("MRTD": Machine Readable Travel Document)
- Digital Signature cards ("SSCD": Secure Signature Creation Device)
- Digital Tachograph
- Travel systems (Mifare)
- Payment cards



Composition advantages:

- Efficient re-use of certifications
- Different developers / labs / certification bodies possible

Costs

 Dependencies between projects



































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Beyond **time** limit of the attacker (>3 months)?

	Identification		Exploitation	
	Name	Points	Name	Points
Time	not practical	∞	<1 day - <1 week	3 – 6
Expertise	Expert	5	Expert	4
Knowledge	Public - Sensitive	0 - 7	Public	0
Access	< 1000	0 – 3	<10 - <100	0 – 4
Equipment	Specialized- bespoke	3 – 5	Specialized - bespoke	4 – 6
Open samples	None	0	-	-
Sub total		13 – ∞		11 – 20
			Total	∞



