Avoiding Falsely Passing a Device in TVLA Testing

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
# **TVLA Background**

- Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA)
  - Conformance testing methodology for side-channel resistance
- Uses known key and data to predict sensitive intermediates
  - Instead of attempting various attacks against an unknown key
- Bounded data collection and analysis time
- Evaluate leakage using Welch's t-Test
  - Allows setting of confidence interval, e.g., 99.999%
- Includes specific and non-specific tests
  - Specific tests map directly to attacks
  - Non-specific tests amplify leaks, accelerating testing

# Signal Finding

- TVLA requires signal finding, which may be a new evaluation skill
- To facilitate evaluation, vendors should provide
  - Schematics
  - Taps
  - Trigger signals
- Signal finding may use
  - Power taps or EM probes
  - Tuner (analog or digital)
  - Demodulation
  - Filtering








# Absence of Signal is Not Absence of Leakage

- An individual t-Test may show no leakage
  - No indication of statistically significant difference between partitions of collected data
- On its own this does not necessarily mean there is no leakage
  - Even for sensitive non-specific ("fixed-vs.-random") tests



• Test setup must be confirmed to be capable of recording leakage

# **Common Sources of Error: Equipment Setup**

- Disconnected wires
- Amplifiers not turned on
- Probe position moved
- Insufficient data collection parameters
  - Sample rate
  - Bandwidth
  - Tuning
  - Filtering






# **Common Sources of Error: Post-Processing**


- Location of operations in time is not correct
  - Too much jitter in operation location in trace
  - Bulk mode (multiple operations per scope trace) issues:
    - Incorrect length of operation
    - Incorrect number of operations per trace
- · Incorrect associating of data being processed and traces, "off-by-one"
  - Individual operations located correctly
  - Incorrect data used for making predictions
  - Leakage will grow up until an extra or missing operation

#### **Incorrectly Handled Operation Jitter**




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# **Incorrectly Specified Operation Length**








# Signal calibration using known leakage

- Calibration signal needed to confirm setup is capable of showing leakage
- Input or output leakage at the cryptographic processing provides this
  - I/O leakage on its own is not enough, need to see input/output from crypto.
  - Temporal ranges must match beginning/end of cryptographic operation
  - Cipher text is generally unprotected and leaks a lot

# Output leakage as calibration



### Calibration signals, beyond simple I/O

- If inputs or outputs provided masked, may need access to the shares
- Compare results to those when disabling
  - Random number generator so masks are fixed
  - Countermeasures



- TVLA results must confirm setup is capable of detecting leakage
  - Signal finding has been successful
  - Test setup is functioning
  - Post-processing has correctly identified operations
- Beware of TVLA results without corresponding calibration
  - Must show leakage from same setup for an unprotected quantity