Efficient Side-Channel Testing Using TVLA (A32a)
Power, electromagnetic, timing and other side-channels are powerful attack vectors for cryptographic devices. Protecting against these attacks is an important design consideration whose results must be validated. Countermeasures may be deployed, but if they are not verified in the final embodiment of the device, they may prove ineffective. Whereas an atacker has potentially unlimited time and resources to mount an attack, the validation against leaks must be done in an efficient and cost-effective way. Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) is a methodology that “levels the field” and provides objective, quantified assessment of leakage within a design. TVLA principles will be presented with case studies and demonstrations correlating TVLA measurements with actual attacks. Using improvements to the TVLA workflow, live testing results will be shown. Processing traces as acquired and using efficient analysis techniques, leakage results are shown in realtime. This allows for improved efficiency by limiting testing time as well as in locating probe positions.